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PRICING DECISIONS AND MARKET POWER IN THE UK ELECTRICITY MARKET: 
A VECM APPROACH1 
 
Chrysovalantis Amountzias*, Hulya Dagdeviren*and Tassos Patokos* 
(*) University of Hertfordshire 
 
 
Abstract: This paper examines the influence of market power in the formation of retail and 
wholesale electricity prices in the UK over 1998-2012 on the basis of Vector Error Correction model 
(VECM).  Market power is measured as the influence of the market share of the Big Six in a dynamic 
demand and supply VECM. The findings indicate that market power of the Big Six in the wholesale 
industry has a significant and large positive influence on the wholesale mark-up in the short-run. The 
long-run estimates support the arguments about ‘revenue rebalancing’ resulting from vertical 
integration. That is, low market power (and hence low revenues) in the wholesale industry leads to 
higher prices (hence higher revenues) in the retail industry. These findings are in contrast to the 
CMA’s finding that no market power is exercised in the wholesale industry. Retail electricity prices 
are affected directly by both the wholesale and retail market concentration ratios in the long-run 
rather than indirectly through the wholesale mark-up. Overall, the findings in this paper provide 
support for the view that the UK electricity market exhibits significant anti-competitive conduct in 
both the retail and wholesale segments.  
Key Words: market power, electricity, retail, wholesale, the Big Six, UK 
                                                          
1 This paper benefited from the comments of two anonymous reviewers. We are thankful to them although 
the responsibility for any errors lies with us, the authors.  
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1. Introduction 
The UK electricity market has gone through substantial changes since the late 1980s involving 
privatisation, changes in the wholesale market from the Pool to the NETA, introduction of retail 
competition and deregulation of prices for end users (Waddams-Price, 2005). While wholesale prices 
declined in the earlier years partly because of falling gas prices (Newberry and Pollitt, 1997), these 
gains could not be maintained in the long term. High prices in wholesale markets under the Pool led 
to the adoption of a bilateral contract system with the introduction of the NETA in 2001. However, 
this reform failed to deliver the low and stable prices that would be expected from a competitive 
market (Woo et al., 2003).  
In more recent years there have been concerns about retail price increases, which instigated a 
probe in 2008 by Ofgem leading to a set of recommendations (Ofgem, 2013a). Despite these, the 
reported revenues, costs and profits of the large energy companies (British Gas, EDF Energy, E.ON 
UK, NPower, Scottish Power and SSE – collectively referred to as “The Big 6”) continued to rise. 
Ofgem (2013b) showed that the earnings before interest and tax in the domestic supply market 
increased by 74.7% from 2011 to 2012. On the other hand, the wholesale electricity cost for the 
average household customer only saw a 2.3% increase in the same period (Ofgem, 2013c), 
suggesting that retail prices increased with a significantly greater pace than wholesale prices. The 
Big 6 justified this on the grounds of rising in input (fuel) costs and investment requirements. 
In March 2014 Ofgem referred the energy markets to the Competition and Market Authority 
(CMA).  This investigation identified a number of areas in the supply of retail electricity and gas 
where the real problems lie. Firstly, the lack of switching or what is termed as ‘weak customer 
engagement’ is highlighted as the most significant shortcoming, giving the Big 6 a position to have 
unilateral market power. Secondly, the reforms introduced by Ofgem after 2011 are claimed to have 
weakened the competition in the sector. Thirdly, limited use of smart meters and lack of a settlement 
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system based on more frequent readings, are considered to have adverse effects on competition in 
the sector. Finally, the existing financial reporting systems in the energy sector as a whole are found 
to be non-transparent, constraining decision making by regulators and policymakers. The possibility 
of tacit coordination amongst suppliers is ruled out on the basis of lack of evidence.  The profitability 
in the wholesale energy markets is not found to be a problem (CMA, 2016). A critical assessment of 
these findings from a policy perspective can be found in Authors (2017).  
Consumer inertia is indeed an issue that emerges in several studies on retail electricity markets. 
For example, Giulietti et al. (2005) argue that an important source of market power acquisition in 
the retail industry relates to the significance of consumers’ decisions regarding switching suppliers. 
Lack of switching enhances the incumbent firms’ market power, and this is reflected in their prices. 
Among the studies that acknowledge and support this view are Defeuilley (2009), Waddams-Price 
(2004) or Waddams-Price and Wilson (2007).   
Market structure is another major issue that has been explored by a multitude of researchers. 
Writing before any NETA effects could be observed, Macatangay (2001) offers a number of ways 
in which providers could abuse the framework and acquire greater marker power. The definition of 
market power in the electricity market is not necessarily the same across different studies. 
Karthikeyan et al. (2013) provide a comprehensive review of the various methodologies that have 
been used for studying market power. In an assessment of NETA, Giulietti et al. (2010b) provide 
empirical evidence showing that, rather than improving the competitiveness of the market, the shift 
to NETA ‘…merely rearranged where money was made in the system’ (p.1165). The data they 
provide are consistent with Toke’s theoretical argument that no drastic changes should be expected 
by the reforms in the electricity market (Toke, 2011).   
This paper estimates the impact of market power on pricing decisions in the wholesale and 
retail segments of the UK electricity industry, employing a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) 
of demand and supply over 1998-2012. The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a 
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discussion of the existing literature on the subject matter. Section 3 describes the model, the 
assumptions and the methodology we use to study pricing decisions in the retail and wholesale 
electricity sector in relation to the suppliers’ market power. Section 4 presents and discusses the 
results and Section 5 concludes by focusing on the policy implications of our findings.  
2. Market power in UK electricity industry 
There is a consensus that market power was a major issue in the UK power market in the years 
following the privatisation and the implementation of the Pool. For example, Sweeting (2001, 2007) 
compares the actual Pool prices with the estimated competitive prices and provides evidence of 
coordinated, tacit collusion by the generators in the second half of the 1990s. This claim is supported 
by a number of studies that arrive at the same conclusion using different methodologies (for instance, 
Wolfram 1999, or Bunn and Martoccia 2005).  Green (2006) offers a comprehensive review of the 
problem of market power in the UK electricity industry from the privatisation and until the end of 
the Pool.      
Generally, the literature on the UK power market has mainly considered three different factors 
in the analysis of prices:  
a) prices of incumbents in comparison to other suppliers operating in the same area, 
b) firm level or industry level price-cost margins  
c) competitive pressure from the demand side; i.e. switching customers. 
For example, Salies and Waddams-Price (2004) show that the incumbents charged between 
4% to 13% more for credit and direct debit customers, despite the fact that they faced greater level 
of competition for these customers from the non-incumbents than for pre-paying customers. The 
difference for credit and direct debit customers is explained on the basis of the reluctance of some 
customers to switch to another supplier even if there are considerable gains. The pre-payment 
services, on the other hand, are more costly and subsidised, and the incumbents with larger market 
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share are in better position to maintain these subsidies. Giulietti et al. (2010b) report similar findings 
about persistent advantage of the incumbents that allowed them to mark up prices by about 10% in 
comparison to non-incumbents, largely because of search costs.  
Moreover, Salies (2008) tests the response of real tariffs to supply factors in the UK electricity 
industry over January 2004. Such factors refer to distribution and transmission costs, consumer 
density and the length of low voltage underground circuit. The model investigates the effect of 
ownership group through dummies on simulated electricity retail bills to capture the effect of market 
power through vertical integration. The findings suggest that the retail price of integrated suppliers 
vary according to the nature of integrated networks. Nevertheless, there is a significant negative 
effect on the price level when there is a change in the number of costumers and a positive effect of 
charges in rural areas. 
Other studies indicate that the increases in retail prices might be reflecting a rebalancing of 
revenues, costs and profits across highly integrated retail and wholesale activities. For example, 
Ofgem (2013d) hints at the possibility that the rising bills might be a way for the suppliers to make 
up for the quite dramatic decrease of the average margin (by about 50%) from 2011 to 2012 in the 
non-domestic market. Giulietti et al. (2010b) use price-cost margins to trace the developments in the 
pricing strategies of electricity companies. Their findings suggest that the shift to the bilateral 
contract system brought about the intended benefits of lower prices in the wholesale electricity 
market, but the decline in wholesale prices have been counterbalanced by rising retail prices and 
profit margins.  
Research into retail electricity prices does not support the claim that increases in prices are 
solely accounted by cost factors. Instead, supply side factors, market domination and power might 
be considered to explain the price increases, along with a number of demand side factors (Otero and 
Waddams-Price, 2001). Despite the domination of the Big 6, the market has seen periods of entry 
and exits. For example, there was a phase when initial entrants into the retail market either exited or 
merged with other companies and as a result the share of the Big 6 suppliers rose to 99% of the 
demand (Giulietti et al., 2010a). Other researchers viewed the growing tendency for vertical 
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integration (or physical hedging) in the sector as a risk management strategy in an environment in 
which demand risks are high and there are limits to other potential hedging strategies (Finon and 
Boroumand, 2011). Interestingly, in the last few years, entry in the power sector has been growing 
again largely because of exemptions provided by the government although the share of the Big 6 still 
remains high (around 90 percent) (CMA, 2016).  
More recent work by Boroumand (2015) concludes that retail competition is not satisfactory 
in the UK electricity industry because of its multimarket setting. This setting, in conjunction with 
vertical integration, promotes oligopolistic profits for the retail firms by utilising parallel pricing 
strategies. The author juxtaposes his analysis of the UK market with Norway’s electricity industry 
which he uses as a benchmark for being very fragmented (about 150 suppliers in 2008) and much 
less concentrated than the UK (the largest 6 suppliers only account for 45%-50% of the market 
share). Despite the example of Norway, it appears that market power in the electricity industry is a 
problem in most developed countries. Olsen et al. (2006) argue that the Swedish and Finnish retail 
markets are not performing as well as Norway’s, mainly because of weak consumer engagement and 
market structure. With regards to EU countries, a report by the ECME Consortium (2010) asserts 
that there is limited price competition in the EU-27 countries (based on consumers’ ratings in these 
countries) and finds that Germany, Finland and the Netherlands are the member states with the 
highest level of price competition, and to a lesser extent Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Sweden and the 
UK. In Spain, the regulations that were introduced in 2006 in an attempt to mitigate the market power 
of the two main electricity producers (Endesa and Iberdrola) were only partly successful (Moutinho 
et al., 2014). Karthikeyan et al. (2013) include a review of market power in the electricity industry 
across a selection of countries.  
In terms of methodology, a wide range of techniques such as the Herfindahl Index, market 
share analysis, price cost margins and econometric models have been used in the literature to 
investigate absence or presence of market power. A detailed review of the studies on market power 
 This is an earlier version of a paper published in  
Energy Policy, Vol 108, Sept 2017, pp. 467-473 
7 
 
with reference to the electricity industry can be found in Twomey et al. (2005) and Karthikeyan et 
al. (2013).  
3. Method of estimation and data 
Many contributions in the empirical literature on the energy industry employ a system of 
interdependent equations to identify the presence of causal relationship amongst various market 
variables (Salies and Waddams, 2003, 2004; Apergis and Payne, 2009)2. Given the presence of non-
stationarity in the time series of the sample, the VECM of this study takes into account the vertical 
integration of the wholesale and the retail electricity industry as a dynamic demand and supply 
system. In order to construct this system, stationarity must be satisfied by all the constituent time 
series (Granger and Newbold, 1974), as non-stationary series would result in incorrect estimates of 
the standard errors. For this reason, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (Dickey and Fuller, 1981) and the 
Phillips-Perron (Phillips and Perron, 1988) unit root tests are used to identify the order of integration 
in the time series.  
 As is also discussed in section 4, the ADF test shows that four out of six series are 𝐼(1) 
except for the market power indicators (see Table 1). Following the Engle and Granger (1987) 
principle that a linear transformation of two or more non-stationary series with the same integration 
order may be stationary, we use the procedure developed by Johansen and Juselius (1992) to identify 
the order of cointegration in the VECM of the wholesale and the retail electricity industry.  
Given the presence of cointegration in our data, we use stationary time series to formulate a dynamic 
demand and supply VECM of the following form 
𝛥𝑝𝑟𝑡 = ∑ 𝑎11𝑖𝛥𝑝𝑟𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝑎12𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
𝑘
𝑖=1 𝛥𝑓𝑐𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝑎13𝑖𝛥𝑚𝑤𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝑎14𝑖𝛥𝑒𝑔𝑡−𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
𝑘
𝑖=1 +   
           + ∑ 𝑎15𝑖𝛥𝑐𝑟𝑡−𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑎16𝑖𝛥𝑐𝑤𝑡−𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 − 𝑠11𝐸𝐶𝑀1,𝑡−1 − 𝑠12𝐸𝐶𝑀2,𝑡−1 + 𝜀1𝑡                           (1)    
                                                          
2 In particular, Salies and Waddams (2003, 2004) employed a SURE model to simultaneously capture the 
interactions of two payment methods, while Apergis and Payne (2009) used a panel Vector Error Correction 
Model. 
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  𝛥𝑓𝑐𝑡 = ∑ 𝑎21𝑖𝛥𝑝𝑟𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝑎22𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
𝑘
𝑖=1 𝛥𝑓𝑐𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝑎23𝑖𝛥𝑚𝑤𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝑎24𝑖𝛥𝑒𝑔𝑡−𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
𝑘
𝑖=1 +   
           + ∑ 𝑎25𝑖𝛥𝑐𝑟𝑡−𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑎26𝑖𝛥𝑐𝑤𝑡−𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 − 𝑠21𝐸𝐶𝑀1,𝑡−1 − 𝑠22𝐸𝐶𝑀2,𝑡−1 + 𝜀2𝑡                           (2)    
 𝛥𝑚𝑤𝑡 = ∑ 𝑎31𝑖𝛥𝑝𝑟𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝑎32𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
𝑘
𝑖=1 𝛥𝑓𝑐𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝑎33𝑖𝛥𝑚𝑤𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝑎34𝑖𝛥𝑒𝑔𝑡−𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
𝑘
𝑖=1 +   
           + ∑ 𝑎35𝑖𝛥𝑐𝑟𝑡−𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑎36𝑖𝛥𝑐𝑤𝑡−𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 − 𝑠31𝐸𝐶𝑀1,𝑡−1 − 𝑠32𝐸𝐶𝑀2,𝑡−1 + 𝜀3𝑡                           (3)    
  𝛥𝑒𝑔𝑡 = ∑ 𝑎41𝑖𝛥𝑝𝑟𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝑎42𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
𝑘
𝑖=1 𝛥𝑓𝑐𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝑎43𝑖𝛥𝑚𝑤𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝑎44𝑖𝛥𝑒𝑔𝑡−𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
𝑘
𝑖=1 +   
           + ∑ 𝑎45𝑖𝛥𝑐𝑟𝑡−𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑎46𝑖𝛥𝑐𝑤𝑡−𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 − 𝑠41𝐸𝐶𝑀1,𝑡−1 − 𝑠42𝐸𝐶𝑀2,𝑡−1 + 𝜀4𝑡                           (4) 
𝛥𝑐𝑟𝑡 = ∑ 𝑎51𝑖𝛥𝑝𝑟𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝑎52𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
𝑘
𝑖=1 𝛥𝑓𝑐𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝑎53𝑖𝛥𝑚𝑤𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝑎54𝑖𝛥𝑒𝑔𝑡−𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
𝑘
𝑖=1 +   
           + ∑ 𝑎55𝑖𝛥𝑐𝑟𝑡−𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑎56𝑖𝛥𝑐𝑤𝑡−𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 − 𝑠51𝐸𝐶𝑀1,𝑡−1 − 𝑠52𝐸𝐶𝑀2,𝑡−1 + 𝜀5𝑡                           (5)    
   𝛥𝑐𝑤𝑡 = ∑ 𝑎61𝑖𝛥𝑝𝑟𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝑎62𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
𝑘
𝑖=1 𝛥𝑓𝑐𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝑎63𝑖𝛥𝑚𝑤𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝑎64𝑖𝛥𝑒𝑔𝑡−𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
𝑘
𝑖=1 +   
           + ∑ 𝑎65𝑖𝛥𝑐𝑟𝑡−𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑎66𝑖𝛥𝑐𝑤𝑡−𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 − 𝑠61𝐸𝐶𝑀1,𝑡−1 − 𝑠62𝐸𝐶𝑀2,𝑡−1 + 𝜀6𝑡                           (6)                         
𝐸𝐶𝑀1,𝑡−1 = 𝑝𝑟𝑡−1 − 𝑏11𝑚𝑤𝑡−1 − 𝑏12𝑒𝑔𝑡−1 − 𝑏13𝑐𝑟𝑡−1 − 𝑏14𝑐𝑤𝑡−1 − 𝑐1                                      (7a) 
𝐸𝐶𝑀2,𝑡−1 = 𝑓𝑐𝑡−1 − 𝑏21𝑚𝑤𝑡−1 − 𝑏22𝑒𝑔𝑡−1 − 𝑏23𝑐𝑟𝑡−1 − 𝑏24𝑐𝑤𝑡−1 − 𝑐2                                     (7b) 
 
Note that these equations will not reveal much about the consequences of multimarket structure, 
except for the retail and wholesale segments of the electricity market. They indicate very little about 
how the regional division of supply and how the interactions and relative market positions of 
incumbents and other suppliers (some of which themselves are incumbents in other regions) are 
reflected onto prices. Instead, the estimations will reflect the influence of selected variables at 
aggregate price levels.    
The variables are expressed in logarithmic forms and the notations are as follows: 𝑝𝑟 is the aggregate 
retail price index of industries and households, 𝑓𝑐 is the final consumption index of electricity 
supplied by the retail industry, 𝑚𝑤 is the wholesale price markup over the fuel cost  of oil, natural 
gas and coal,  𝑒𝑔 is the electricity generated by the wholesale industry, 𝑐𝑟 and 𝑐𝑤 are the market 
share of the biggest generators and suppliers in the retail and wholesale industry respectively, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
are i.i.d. random error terms that are assumed to account for all the non-systematic and non-
measurable influences. Under perfect competition with instantaneous price adjustments, the price 
level would be equal to the cost of inputs and thus, the price-cost margin would be equal to unity. 
As the energy sector has an oligopolistic market structure, it is worth investigating how the cost of 
 This is an earlier version of a paper published in  
Energy Policy, Vol 108, Sept 2017, pp. 467-473 
9 
 
inputs and market concentration influence the pricing decisions of the wholesale and retail electricity 
industry.3 The VECM employed here captures the disequilibrium and incorporates the most 
important market factors in the pricing decisions of the industries. In particular, the constituent 
equations capture the relationship between the UK electricity prices, demand and supply variables 
and the degree of market power in the both industries. The theoretical interpretation of these 
equations reflects that industrial prices are expressed as markups over input costs and market power.  
 Equations (1)-(6) correspond to the components of the VECM for the wholesale and the 
retail electricity industry. The coefficients 𝑎𝑗𝑖 are constants that represent a short-run relationship 
with the dependent variable and 𝑠𝑗𝑖 denote the speed of price adjustment of each equation to 
equilibrium. Equations for 𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑖,𝑡−2 are the cointegrating equations which enter 
the VECM. Finally, 𝑏𝑗𝑖  are coefficients of the long-run relationships, with the 𝑏𝑗0′𝑠 which are 
normalized to one.  
 The final step of the estimation process employs the Granger causality test in order to 
identify short-run causal effects running from the independent to the dependent variables of the 
system. It is a simple and straightforward test which can detect the presence of a causal relationship 
between two variables 𝑦 and 𝑥. Time series 𝑦 is Granger-causing time series 𝑥 when there is joint 
significance of the lagged values of 𝑦 on 𝑥. As in Johansen’s test, this test can only be applied on 
stationary variables in order to avoid inefficient results, as proposed by Granger and Newbold (1974). 
The empirical study employs time series quarterly data for the UK wholesale and retail 
electricity industry over the period 1998Q1-2012Q2. The observations of the price and fuel cost 
variables have been obtained from the Ofgem database. Price indices use 2005Q3 as the base quarter. 
It is worth noting that the aggregate retail price index also includes distribution and transmission 
charges. Unlike Salies and Waddams (2004), these measures are not included in the system as 
                                                          
3 The main input of the wholesale industry is the fuel cost index, while the input of the retail industry is the 
wholesale price which reflects the purchase cost of electricity. 
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explanatory variables due to the limitations of observations and the significance of the concentration 
ratios. Thereby, part of the fluctuations of the retail price index in the VECM may remain 
unexplained. The variables of electricity generation and consumption have been obtained from the 
DECC historical electricity database. Electricity generation and consumption are expressed in 
terawatt hours (TWh).  The observations would naturally lead to more accurate results if the time 
interval was on hourly or basis; but while this would have been possible for the wholesale industry 
as the Ofgem database provides hourly price and generation data, such observations are not available 
for the retail industry as prices are not set on a daily basis. 
4. Empirical results and findings 
The results of the unit root tests for the constituent time series are presented in Table 1 and show that 
all variables are 𝐼(1) with the exception of 𝑐𝑟 and 𝑐𝑤 which are stationary in level. Hence, the 
Johansen’s (Johansen and Juselius, 1992) test is employed in order to test the presence and order of 
cointegration for the wholesale and retail electricity industry over the sample period.4 The results are 
presented in Table 2 and they suggest that two cointegrating equations emerge. Consequently, the 
VECM for the retail and wholesale electricity industry exhibits two equilibria where the retail price 
and final consumption level are used as dependent variables. This means that by including the 
selected variables in first differences in a VECM framework will enable to examine the presence of 
long-run and short-run relationship amongst the constituent variables. 
Table 1: Unit root tests 
Variables ADF PP 
Services   
𝑝𝑟 -2.431     [0.3601] -2.127      [0.5199] 
∆𝑝𝑟 -4.118 *  [0.0103] -4.230 ** [0.0076] 
𝑓𝑐 -0.820     [0.9566] -6.569**  [0.0000] 
∆𝑓𝑐 -5.851** [0.0001] -21.72 ** [0.0001] 
𝑚𝑤 -2.991     [0.4175] -2.749      [0.2217] 
∆𝑚𝑤 -3.753 *  [0.0275] -13.47**  [0.0000] 
𝑒𝑔 -0.605     [0.9743] -6.635**  [0.0000] 
                                                          
4 In contrast with Johansen’s (1992) proposition that the constituent time series must 𝐼(1) Lütkepohl and 
Krätzig (2004) argue that in many cases it is convenient to test the cointegration of both 𝐼(1) and 𝐼(0) series 
in systems. As a result, the Johansen cointegration test can be conducted amongst time series of different 
order of integration. 
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∆𝑒𝑔 -5.644** [0.0001] -22.28**  [0.0001] 
𝑐𝑟 -3.907** [0.0001] -6.331**  [0.0000] 
𝛥𝑐𝑟 -4.279** [0.0071] -14.16**  [0.0000] 
𝑐𝑤 -4.945** [0.0010] -5.885**  [0.0000] 
𝛥𝑐𝑤 -4.597** [0.0000] -14.98**  [0.0000] 
Notes: ADF refers to the Augmented Dickey Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979). PP is the Phillips-Perron 
test (Phillips and Perron, 1988). The hypotheses of both tests assume that H0: Non-stationary series (presence 
of unit root) versus H1: Stationary series. The time series include a trend and intercept. 
The calculated statistics correspond to the ones reported in Dickey and Fuller (1981). The unit root tests have 
been conducted according to the indications of the Schwarz Information Criteria (Schwarz, 1978). 
The numbers in brackets indicate p-values. 
*Significant at the 5% level of significance. 
** Significant at the 1% level of significance. 
 
Table 2. Johansen and Juselius cointegration test 
No. of 
Cointegrating 
equation(s) 
Eigen 
value 
Trace Critical 
Value 
(Trace) 
Max-Eigen 
Statistic 
Critical Value 
(Max-Eigen 
Statistic) 
𝑟 = 0 0.7089 173.216** 
[0.0000] 
125.75 106.77** 
[0.0071] 
80.075 
𝑟 ≤ 1 0.3272 74.512* 
[0.0281] 
70.893 40.822* 
[0.0323] 
37.827 
𝑟 ≤ 2 0.1506 33.778 
[0.2251] 
51.133 20.303  
[0.1766] 
29.348 
Notes: The Trace statistic and the Max-Eigen statistic are calculated including an intercept and a linear trend. 
Given the finite sample size of the data set, the trace statistics have been calculated according to the 
indications of Cheung and Lai (1993).  
The numbers in brackets indicate p-values.  
* Significant at the 5% level of significance. 
** Significant at the 1% level of significance. 
 
The VECM reflects the long and short-run effects on the pricing decisions of the wholesale 
and the retail industry respectively. Given that the wholesale industry provides the input of the retail 
industry, effect of vertical integration can be captured by a system of this form. In addition, pricing 
decisions are affected by production decisions and thus, market concentration of the biggest firms in 
the industry could significantly contribute to fluctuations in the price level both in the long-run and 
in the short-run.5 For this reason, any possible form of endogeneity emerging from the explanatory 
variables is taken into account across equations (1)-(6). 
The VECM is estimated in a two-stage procedure similar to the single error correction model 
estimation as proposed by Kremers et al. (1992). The estimates obtained by this process correspond 
                                                          
5 See Salies (2008) for more information on using ownership dummies as proxy of market power. 
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to the long-run and short-run effects of the explanatory variables on the dependent variables. In 
particular, Table 3 presents the long-run relationship identified by the cointegrating equations (7a) 
and (7b).  
 
 
Table 3: Long run estimates. 
 𝐸𝑐𝑚1,𝑡−1 𝐸𝑐𝑚2,𝑡−1 
Variables   
𝑚𝑤𝑡−1   0.075      (1.161)   0.084**   (3.905) 
𝑒𝑔𝑡−1 -2.899**  (-16.45)   1.730**  (29.40) 
𝑐𝑟𝑡−1  0.351**   (5.242)  - 0.140** (-6.281) 
𝑐𝑤𝑡−1 -0.350**   (-6.181)   0.132**   (6.967) 
Diagnostic tests    
LM testa 4.742 [0.09]  2.649 [0.26] 
White’s testb 7.527 [0.10]  8.356 [0.08] 
RESETc 2.024 [0.16]  0.170 [0.68] 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses refer to t-statistics. The numbers in brackets indicate p-values following 
the chi-squared distribution. 
a H0: No serial correlation versus H1: Serial correlation of k=2 lag order. 
b H0: Homoskedasticity versus H1: Heteroskedasticity of unknown form. 
c H0: No misspecification versus H1: Misspecification in the error term (non-linear combinations of the 
independent variables explain the dependent variable). 
*Significant at the 5% level of significance. 
** Significant at the 1% level of significance. 
 
The most interesting result in the first cointegrating equation is that the retail prices are affected 
positively by concentration in the retail market but negatively by concentration in the wholesale 
market in the long-run. These effects are statistically significant. This finding provides support for 
the previously mentioned arguments about ‘revenue rebalancing’ in vertically integrated industries. 
That is, low market concentration in the wholesale industry, for example, may reduce the wholesale 
revenues and lead the Big Six to rebalance their overall desired profitability through higher prices in 
the retail sector. The results show that a one percent decline in the market share of the Big Six in the 
wholesale industry tends to raise the retail price level by 0.35 per cent. If lower market power in the 
wholesale sector is accompanied by higher concentration in the retail sector, then the results imply 
a double pressure on retail prices. The coefficient on retail market concentration indicates that as the 
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biggest suppliers increase their market share, the aggregate price level of the industry increases by 
another 0.35 per cent. Even if that influence is inelastic, the effect is significant reflecting the 
imperfect competitive conduct of the constituent firms (Giulietti et al., 2010a, 2010b; Boroumand, 
2015).  
This interpretation is further strengthened by the relationship between retail prices and the wholesale 
mark-up. While the latter variable has positive impact on retail prices in the long run, this is 
statistically insignificant, suggesting that the effect of market power on retail prices is not passed 
through particular forms of pricing strategy in the wholesale market but direct manipulation of prices 
in the retail market. On the other hand, the results show that as the volume of electricity generated is 
reduced by the wholesale industry, the retail price level tend to increase. This is consistent with the 
theory in that retail firms can restrain their capacity in order to increase the price level and thus, 
increase their profit. 
The Cointegrating Equation 2 shows that every variable has a significant long-run effect on the level 
of final electricity consumption by the residential and non-residential customers. In particular, the 
wholesale price markup has an inelastic and positive effect on electricity supplied by the retail 
industry. This means that as the margin between the wholesale price and the fuel cost increases, 
electricity consumption rises as well. While this may seem a contradiction, when it is considered in 
connection with the discussion about the Cointegrating Equation 1 it is easy to see the consistency. 
That is, higher mark-ups in the wholesale sector may reduce the need for revenue rebalancing and 
keep the retail prices low which in turn would motivate higher electricity consumption. The 
relationship between generation and final electricity consumption is positive as expected, that is, 
quantity adjustments on the supply side are positively related to the quantity adjustments on the 
demand side through opposite changes in the price levels. In other words, reduction of generation 
increases consumption, through its negative impact on final prices. Finally, the market share of the 
biggest retailers has a negative effect on final consumption, which is in accordance with the findings 
in the former cointegrating equation. Higher concentration in retail market leads to higher prices 
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which in turn lead to adjustments on the demand side. On the other hand, higher concentration in the 
wholesale market reduces the need for rebalancing in the retail market and hence lowers the retail 
prices which in return motivates greater consumption. 
Table 4 presents the results of causality for the wholesale and the retail electricity industry 
both in the long-run and in the short-run. These show that in the short run retail prices are not affected 
by changes in market share of the Big Six (i.e. market concentration ratios). Neither are they 
influenced by changes in final consumption. Unlike the findings related to the long-run estimations, 
the results for the short run suggest that the only statistically significant Granger causation with 
respect to the retail electricity prices is due to the changes in wholesale price markup. On the other 
hand, the wholesale market share of the Big Six determine the wholesale mark-ups. The influence 
of market concentration ratio on wholesale price is positive with estimates suggesting a significant 
effect at the one percent level of significance.  
This finding is consistent with the findings of previous studies highlighting the failures in 
the wholesale industry with respect to competition (Woo et al., 2003). However, it contradicts the 
recent judgement made by the CMA following its investigation of the energy market.  Finally, the 
concentration ratios in retail and wholesale electricity market in the short run seem to be independent 
of most factors included in the estimations. The only exception is the weak significance of retail 
market concentration in determining the market power in the wholesale industry. This means that as 
the retail industry becomes more concentrated, the wholesale industry becomes less concentrated as 
the retailers acquire monopsony power6.  
Table 4: Short-run and long-run causality tests. 
 
Dependent 
Variables 
 
Sources of short-run causation  
Adjustmen
t to 
𝐸𝑐𝑚1,𝑡−1 
Adjustmen
t to 
𝐸𝑐𝑚2,𝑡−1 
 ∆𝑝𝑟 ∆𝑓𝑐 ∆𝑚𝑤 ∆𝑒𝑔 ∆𝑐𝑟 ∆𝑐𝑤   
∆𝑝𝑟 - 0.541 
[0.46] 
4.230* 
[0.03] 
0.236 
[0.62] 
0.750 
[0.38] 
1.326 
[0.24] 
0.003 
(0.362) 
0.017 
(0.538) 
                                                          
6 This holds because the short-run coefficient is negative. The short-run estimates and relevant material are 
available upon request. 
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∆𝑓𝑐 9.114** 
 [0.00] 
- 10.97** 
[0.00] 
1.433 
[0.23] 
8.700** 
[0.00] 
13.44** 
[0.00] 
-0.943** 
(-6.213) 
-1.278* 
(-2.154) 
∆𝑚𝑤 2.083 
[0.14] 
0.715 
[0.39] 
- 0.547 
[0.45] 
2.547 
[0.11] 
6.680** 
[0.00] 
-0.317 
(-1.821) 
-0.365 
(-0.537) 
∆𝑒𝑔 8.833** 
[0.00] 
0.003 
[0.95] 
11.59** 
[0.00] 
- 13.64** 
[0.00] 
17.88** 
[0.00] 
-0.762** 
(-4.791) 
-0.393 
(-0.633) 
∆𝑐𝑟 3.010 
[0.08] 
0.081 
[0.77] 
0.734 
[0.39] 
0.858 
[0.35] 
- 2.262 
[0.13] 
-1.342 
(-0.800) 
0.912 
(0.902) 
∆𝑐𝑤 1.503 
[0.22] 
0.051 
[0.82] 
0.175 
[0.67] 
2.207 
[0.13] 
3.827* 
[0.04] 
- -3.856* 
(-2.00) 
-1.873 
(-0.249) 
Notes: The numbers of short-run causation indicate the F-statistic values of the joint hypothesis of causality 
by incorporating the lagged values of the representative short-run changes.  
The numbers in parentheses refer to t-statistics. 
The numbers in brackets refer to the p-values following the chi-squared distribution. 
*Significant at the 5% level of significance. 
** Significant at the 1% level of significance. 
 
 
The results in relation to the final consumption do not confirm our expectations. These 
suggest that the growth in retail prices, mark-up and concentration ratios trigger positive impact on 
final consumption of electricity. Although this is in contrast to theoretical prediction, it may be 
reflecting the inability of customers to make quantity adjustments in the very short-term due to low 
elasticity on the demand side, which is a well-known aspect of essential services such as electricity. 
On the other hand, there is also significant evidence of long-run causality running from the 
cointegrating equations (7a) and (7b) to the short-run equations of the VECM. In particular, the final 
consumption equation, electricity generation and wholesale concentration are Granger caused by 
(7a), suggesting that they converge to this particular equilibrium point.  
The time of adjustment is calculated as noted by Olive (2008) using the mean lag formula 
[1 + (1 − |𝑠𝑖|)/|𝑠𝑖|]. It identifies the maximum number of quarters needed to converge to the long-
run state price level, assuming that no additional changes occur in the market. Thereby, the 
adjustment in retail price levels predicted by (7a) require a little less than two quarters. The second 
cointegrating equation only causes final consumption, suggesting that every other equation does not 
converge to this particular long-run condition.  
On the other hand, the equations of retail price, wholesale markup and retail concentration 
have an insignificant value of adjustment to both cointegrating equations. This shows that there is 
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no convergence to either long-run condition, thus these variables can be viewed as weakly 
exogenous. Consequently, they may be determined outside the present system of equations by 
additional market factors which have not been included in our analysis. This means that in the context 
of the model, equations (1) and (3) reflect a short-run causality running from the wholesale markup 
and the wholesale concentration indicators respectively without converging to the long-run 
conditions captured by the two cointegrating equations. 
 Overall, the results of this study suggest two cointegrating equations where the retail price 
level is affected in the long-run by the market shares of the Big Six in both the retail and the whole 
sale market rather than the mark-up in the wholesale price. The estimates suggest the Big Six employ 
a ‘rebalancing strategy’. On the other hand, in the short-run the mark-up in the wholesale market is 
the only factor with impact on the retail prices. Moreover, the market concentration by the Big Six 
has a strong influence on the mark-up in the short run. Electricity generation and final consumption 
appear a positive relationship only in the long-run as market rigidities may restrict any short-run 
interactions and decisions.  
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications  
This paper analysed the influence of market power on the formation of retail and wholesale pricing 
decisions in the UK on the basis of quarterly data extending from 1998 to 2012. The estimations are 
based on Vector Error Correction Method (VECM) in order to consider the interactions of electricity 
demand and supply.  Market concentration of the biggest generators and suppliers is used as a proxy 
of market power. 
Broadly, the results suggest that there are significant market failures arising from market power in 
both the retail and wholesale elements of the electricity industry. A number of findings in this paper 
merit highlighting. An important result is that market concentration by the Big Six in both segments 
of the electricity market exerts a significant influence on the retail prices in the long-run. This impact 
is direct with respect to the market power in the retail segment of the market but indirect with respect 
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to the market concentration in the wholesale segment, not through wholesale mark-up but through 
‘revenue rebalancing’. More specifically, lower market power in the wholesale electricity sector 
results in lower wholesale mark-up and increases the need for higher prices in the retail sector. 
‘Revenue rebalancing’ is further confirmed by the positive relationship between wholesale markup 
and final consumption. That is lower wholesale mark-ups are counterbalanced with higher retail 
prices which then lead to lower consumption of electricity.  
In the short run, however, market power has a significant effect on retail prices, passed through the 
wholesale mark-up rather than market concentration in either segment of the electricity industry. 
Moreover, wholesale market concentration by the Big Six has a positive and statistically significant 
impact on wholesale price mark-up. Overall then, a significant overpricing pattern emerge in retail 
and wholesale electricity markets both in the short run and the long-run. 
These findings have a number of policy implications for the UK electricity market. First and foremost 
is the result about the market power and pricing in the wholesale electricity market. While the recent 
investigation by the CMA concluded that the UK wholesale market does not suffer from adverse 
effect on competition (AEC) our estimations raise significant doubts about the validity of this 
conclusion and call for a re-examination of the wholesale market, using a dynamic estimation 
method, as done in this paper.  
Secondly, the CMA’s results are based on a disintegrated / isolated analysis of wholesale and retail 
segments of the electricity industry as discussed by Authors (2017). Given the Big Six are vertically 
integrated companies, any investigation into AEC requires a method that allows for interdependent 
interactions between wholesale and retail sectors as in our estimations. The findings in this paper in 
favour of ‘revenue rebalancing’ arising from vertical integration is particularly challenging for the 
CMA’s conclusions.   
Finally, this paper shows that market dynamics differ in the long and the short term. Such differences 
can be important for structural (corresponding to long-run) and transitional policy instruments 
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(corresponding to short-run). Misleading policies may be applied if short-term analysis is used to 
devise longer–term solutions. For example, our short run analysis indicated that market 
concentration ratios have no significant impact on retail prices. However, the incompleteness of this 
analysis becomes clear with opposite findings in the long-run. In the full picture, market power 
impacts retail prices through market concentration in the long-run but through wholesale price mark-
up in the short run. The fact that CMA’s investigation covered a limited period of time (starting from 
2009 unlike our estimations) raise doubts about its results capturing the market dynamics in the long-
run.  
The overall conclusion is that it is likely that the UK electricity market will continue to suffer from 
significant market failures. This is especially because the remedies devised by the CMA heavily rely 
on customer mobility instead of directly addressing the issues associated with vertical integration 
and market concentration by the Big Six. Any future investigation due to ongoing market power 
abuses should be open to a range of policy options, including nationalisation, breaking up large 
companies and market regulation.  
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